Anti-proliferation safeguard system for General Electric's PRISM reactor plant by Tenorio, Luis E
Anti-Proliferation Safeguard System
for General Electric's PRISM Reactor Plant
by
Luis E Tenorio
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Science and
Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Bachelor of Science
at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
June 2008
© 2008 Luis E Tenorio
All Rights Reserved
The author hereby grants MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and
electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium
now known or hereafter created.
Signature of Author ...............
Certified by...
Accepted by ............. ................
Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering
May 9, 2008
Michael Golay
Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
...... ....
David Cory
Professor of Science and Engineering
Chairman • NSE Undergraduate Committee
ARCHPVE"
MASSACHUSETTS INSTMIE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUL 2 4 2008
LIBRARIES
Anti-Proliferation Safeguard System
for General Electric's PRISM Reactor Plant
by
Luis E Tenorio
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering on May 9, 2008
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirments for the Degree of
Bachelor of Science in Nuclear Science and Engineering
Abstract
The proliferation resistance of a nuclear power plant has become an increasingly
important issue due to the political climate of nuclear power at the present. Any new power
plant that is constructed must be proliferation resistant and meet international standards set by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In an age with a War on Terrorism and states
not declaring their nuclear intentions, nuclear power needs to have proliferation resistance be a
primary concern if nuclear power plants are to be built in the future.
The PRISM nuclear reactor system has been examined in this work with focus on the
movement of nuclear fuel. The PRISM was chosen as the system to develop a proliferation
safeguard system because of the literature that has been readily available for it and its potential
use in the MIT Sodium Fast Reactor project. The safeguard system is based on the CANDU
safeguard system with new components included to address diversion scenarios that were
developed as part of this work. This work consists of developing those scenarios and the
safeguard system. Also, research into the different components has been done.
Basing the system on proven work and showing that such systems can be adapted allows
this system to be versatile in its use and implementation.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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1. Introduction
1.1 The Sodium Fast Reactor Project
The Sodium Fast Reactor Project (SFR Project) is currently a collaboration between
faculty and students from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ohio State University and
Idaho State University for the purpose of examining current sodium cooled reactors designs and
deciding which aspects of these designs to use in a new sodium fast reactor facility. The project
is part of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) from the Department of Energy (DOE).
Currently there are 104 nuclear power reactors in the United States which provide about
20% of the electricity used in the country. (1) Electricity use in the United States may increase
by as much as 75%. (2) Fossil fuels produce copious amounts of greenhouse gasses and nuclear
power is an alternative to fossil fuel electricity production. The SFRP aims to design a new
sodium fast reactor facility which may also serve as a burner of nuclear waste from light water
reactors and therefore reduce the nuclear waste the facility produces and that of other nuclear
power plants.
1.2 Nuclear Weapon Proliferation 2008
Nuclear Proliferation today has once again garnered a significant amount of attention in
the media with the recent negotiations between North Korea and the United States concerning its
nuclear weapons program and the possibility of Iran using its nuclear power program as a cover
to develop its own weapons. At the present, eight countries have nuclear weapons while three of
them (Israel, Pakistan, India) have not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty keeping proliferation
a very real possibility.
So far, the civilian nuclear power infrastructure of a country will not be used as the basis
of a nuclear weapons program though material derived from the power industry may be used in
such a manner. More often a country will have dedicated nuclear weapons program that is
visible to the rest of the world. The risk of proliferation comes from terrorist groups or the states
that host them. The threat of proliferation from these groups can come from the diversion of
nuclear material, misuse of nuclear technology or transfer of nuclear technology information. (3)
Terrorist groups in particular would try to divert nuclear material for building a weapon and this
drives national security concerns for the countries building new power plants and it drives the
debate about the use of nuclear power.
Because of this, the Generation IV requisites include reducing proliferation. The
Generation IV requisites are those to be met for new plants currently being developed and also
include having the plants be economical, safe, and low waste producing. So designing an
effective safeguard system for the nuclear material of any new nuclear power facility is essential
for the security of the nation and the acceptance of nuclear power in the United States and
abroad.
1.3 Objective
The Sodium Fast Reactor Project aims to implement measures against proliferation in
order to make the selling and licensing of the facility much easier. Such measures can include
the choice of fuel used at the facility and the core design and the instrumentation used to account
for the nuclear material of this facility.
One of the sodium fast reactors that is being examined by the SFRP is the PRISM reactor
by General Electric. This thesis outlines the most likely diversion scenarios and a safeguard
system for the PRISM facility. The safeguard system is supposed to keep track of the nuclear
material in the facility including waste from the PRISM facility and waste brought into from
LWRs for the purpose of burning.
1.4 Methodology
The approach used to identify the diversion scenarios is that of taking the position of the
proliferator who wishes to extract enough nuclear material from the SFR sodium reactor system
to create a nuclear weapon. Doing so requires taking into consideration things such as time,
shielding, transportation and amount of material.
Taking existing safeguard systems for different reactors in the United States and around
the world and modifying them or adding to them for the purpose of is the approach used for the
design of the PRISM safeguard system. The instrumentation from facilities such as the CANDU,
ESFR and EBR-II can be applied to the PRISM. There are however, portions of the PRISM
facility that are not addressed such as the tracking of vehicles that transport nuclear material in
and outside the facility and safeguards for such situations are created to address them.
Improvements to the way that nuclear material is accounted for are also made to this portion of
the SFR Project.
1.5 Results
Two likely diversion scenarios are detailed in this thesis. The diversion of nuclear
material has the intended purpose of building a fission weapon from the material at the facility.
Plutonium content of the fuel pins is the primary goal of a diverter and the more plutonium the
more enticing diverting the fuel pins is.
Diversion of a fuel transfer cask is the most likely scenario for a diverter to obtain the
desired nuclear material. The transfer cask is transferred by a vehicle that can either move the
cask to and from the reactor building to from an onsite fuel cycle facility or offsite. The vehicle
can be commandeered or the driver can be coerced into diverting the vehicle with the nuclear
material onboard to a location of the diverter's choosing.
A second diversion scenario that was addressed was where a diverter creates a dummy
fuel pin that is used to replace a real fuel pin. A single or perhaps multiple fuel pins are switched
out and are taken out of the facility on a vehicle or the material is carried by a person out of the
facility. Enough material for a nuclear weapon would be taken out of the pins and diverted away
before the facility administrators could notice that the pins had been switched.
The safeguard system for the PRISM includes measures from the CANDU and EBR II
facilities. The two types of measures used are radiation detectors and tamper indicating seals on
waste containers. The radiation detectors are either neutron or gamma ray detectors which verify
that the fuel pins entering and exiting buildings in the facility are actual nuclear material that is
supposed to be present. The tamper indicating seals show whether or not a person has tried to
extract nuclear material from the waste casks located at the plant or (if located elsewhere) the
fuel cycle facility.
New features for the facility include weight scales that monitor the presence of the
nuclear material at all times and a dual geosynchronous positioning system (GPS) which tracks
the position of the fuel assemblies inside the transfer cask and the vehicle which is transporting
the nuclear material.
2. Methodology Description
The design of a safeguard system has been developed by basing the system on a
previously used safeguard system and by developing diversion scenarios for the fuel used at the
plant. Using previous safeguards allows one to use components which have been proven in the
field before while diversion scenario development is developed through thinking about gaining
nuclear fuel and what the diverter wishes to achieve.
2.1 System Basis: CANDU Safeguard System
The CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactor is a heavy water reactor which uses
natural uranium for fuel. The use of natural uranium brings about the need for daily refueling for
the reactor. This constant fuel movement brings about the development of a safeguard system
which can effectively track and account for the fuel of the CANDU. In addition to the safeguard
system, Canada has agreed to the NPT and makes it a priority to show that its nuclear power
program is for only peaceful purposes.
The tracking of fuel and diversion detection and prevent are the core of the safeguard
system. The CANDU reactor does use natural uranium which would require a proliferator to
take a large amount of fuel (over 2 tons). (4) This serves as discouragement for a proliferator
from trying to divert fuel from the CANDU. The plants also have physical safeguards such as
armed guards and physical barriers such as gates and walls.
The fuel of the CANDU reactor is removed from the core by a fueling machine which
then moves it to a transfer bay. A spent fuel bundle counter (SFBC) then verifies the fuel
through radiation detection and counts the bundles as they move from the core to the transfer
bay. There are core discharge monitors (CDM) which detect radiation from the bundles in order
to detect an unauthorized bundle movement from the core. Spent fuel is stored in the Spent Fuel
Bay and monitored by radiation detectors or sealed using IAEA approved Atomic Energy
Canada Limited Random Coil seals. The whole plant is monitored by security cameras. Figure
2.1 shows the CANDU plant and the implementation of the different safeguard equipment as the
spent fuel bundles move through the plant.
Legend
Stacking Frame with ARC Seals
CCTV Surveillance Camera
Yes/No Radiation Monitor
Spent Fuel Bundle Counter
Core Discharge Monitor
Figure 2.1 CANDU Safeguard System (4)
The PRISM safeguard system is based on the CANDU by taking the similarities of the
PRISM plant to the CANDU and applying safeguards that are used in similar situations. The
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CDM is the component that is taken directly from the CANDU. The SFBC, sealing systems and
security camera systems are taken and new and improved systems are used in the PRISM
safeguard system.
2.2 Developing Diversion Scenarios
The diversion of nuclear fuel at the PRISM plant is developed through consideration of
the cost and benefit to the diverter, the ability and technology available to the diverter and the
ease of access for the diverter.
The minimum amount of plutonium-239 that would be enough to produce a weapon is 8
kg. A PRISM fuel assembly contains about 9.94 kg of plutonium before entering the core and
7.68 kg after it has been burned. (5) Therefore losing two spent assemblies is unacceptable and
tracking of fresh fuel and spent fuel is crucial.
A diverter may have nuclear material that is useable for a nuclear weapon and may be
willing to sacrifice or risk that in order to gain more material that can allow for the completion of
nuclear weapon. The diverter may also be willing to sacrifice people to achieve their goal. This
then allows for a person to carry nuclear material on their body if they are willing to sacrifice
themselves.
The other consideration that develops a diversion scenario is the resources that a diverter
has a their disposal. The diverter may or may not have the technology to develop a nuclear
weapon or they may not have the material to sacrifice for the diversion. But in the development
of the diversion scenarios, we have assumed that both the technology and resources do exist for
the diverter.
2.3 Addressing Diversion Scenarios
The diversion scenarios lead to the consideration of additional safeguards beyond those
used at the CANDU reactor. New components are placed into the design in order to prevent the
diversion of fuel from these scenarios.
3. PRISM Design
In order to be able to create a safeguard system for the PRISM plant, it is necessary to
understand as much of the plant as possible. The emphasis is on the movement and storage of
fuel throughout the entire plant as well as the processing facilities that may not be co-located
with the plant.
3.1 PRISM Objectives and History
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was announced by Department of
Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman February 6th, 2006. The plan is a partnership between
different countries started by Japan, France and the United States which aims to reprocess spent
nuclear fuel from other power reactors and do so in such a way that makes the fuel unusable for
weapons purposes. (4) The GNEP vision needs a proven example that can demonstrate the
viability of fast burner reactors. Support for the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) depends
on such a demonstration. The ABTR is a liquid sodium cooled fast reactor which is the
technology that is the choice of the NRC. The ABTR needs a demonstration of transmutation of
transuranic elements, safety, cost reduction and safeguards. (5) This demonstration has to come
from a previous fast reactor design.
The Power Reactor Innovative Small Module (PRISM) is a liquid sodium cooled fast
reactor designed by General Electric with help from Argonne National Labs. The PRISM was
designed to provide a reactor which is reliable, has passive safety feature and is economically
competitive with other power generating technologies. Because of it's similarity to the ABTR,
the PRISM is used as for understanding strategies behind licensing a reactor that follows the
Generation IV requisite and follows the GNEP vision.
The Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) program was authorized by congress to
design a liquid metal fast breeder reactor in 1970. The program emphasized transmutation of
transuranic elements along with defense-in-depth safety. The program required licensing after
the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act but licensing was not completed when the program was
terminated in 1983. At this time, the development of fast reactors was divided into two
programs: the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR) and the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor (ALMR).
General Electric decided to pursue the ALMR which resulted in the PRISM. The Department of
Energy submitted the Preliminary Safety Information Document in 1986 and the Preapplication
Safety Evaluation Report in 1994.
3.2 PRISM Facility Description
3.2.1 Reactor Module Description
"The PRISM reactor is a small, modular, pool-type, liquid sodium cooled reactor which
produces 471 MWt power." (6) Figure 3.1 is a cut-away of the standard reactor module. The
modules are supposed to be small for the purpose of being constructed away from the plant site
and being transported to the plant by rail. For a standard power plant, there would be three
reactor modules at the facility with each reactor expected to have a 60 year lifespan. A power
block consists of 3 reactor modules and would produce 465 MWe power. A plant would have up
to 3 power blocks for a total of 1319 MWe power total. Each reactor module has its own
intermediate heat transport system and steam generator. The reactors are all controlled by the
same control center, maintenance facility.
REACTOR
SILO
Figure 3.1 Reactor Module (8)
PRISM reactor modules are 19 m high and 6 m in diameter. (6) The reactor module and
its components are seismically isolated in order to reduce horizontal movement and the silo is
below grade. The vessel is 5 centimeter thick stainless steel andl8.83 ft in diameter and 55 ft 7
inches high. There is a 38.6 centimeter gap between the reactor vessel and the containment
vessel which is filled with argon gas. The gap is intended to provided the ability to perform a
visual inspection of both vessels as well as contain a coolant leak. The closure head is a steel
plate with a rotatable plug for refueling purposes.
The fuel used in the core is a metallic alloy (Uranium, Plutonium, Zirconium) in a HT9
stainless steel cladding. (5) The core's reactivity and power level are controlled by six
independent control rods. One control rod is enough to shut down the reactor. There is an
ultimate shutdown system at the center of the core to bring the reactor to shutdown if the control
rods cannot be inserted.
The coolant is moved through the core by four electromagnetic pumps. The pumps are
powered by a non-Class 1E ac distribution system. If the power system fails, a secondary offsite
power system can run the pumps. There is no emergency ac system if the primary and secondary
power systems fail the head is removed from the core through the intermediate sodium loop and
through the intermediate heat exchanger.
3.2.2 Power Plant Description
Figure 3.2 shows a diagram for a standard power plant using the PRISM design. There
would be 3 power blocks each with 3 reactor modules for a total of 9 reactors on site. The
reactors would be below grade and all be controlled by the same control system at the control
building. As shown in Figure 3.2, the reactors would each have their own steam generator and
there would be a turbine facility for each power block. The total electrical power coming from
the plant would be 1395 MW.
Figure 3.2 PRISM Power Plant (8)
The plant would have a security center where all close circuit television (CCTV)
monitoring would be done in addition to monitoring of other security measures. There would be
a high security barrier around the entire plant with exits at select points in the barrier.
Optional to the plant would be the fuel cycle facility. Because of the added cost to the
plant, fuel cycle facilities may be used to service multiple plants. While it may be possible for a
plant to have an on site fuel cycle facility, it would not be a likely scenario.
3.2.3 PRISM Fuel
Figure 3.3 shows the arrangement of the core for the PRISM reactors. The fuel is a metal
alloy consisting of uranium, plutonium and zirconium in a clad made of the HT9 steel alloy.
Each fuel assembly would be made of 331 fuel rods and the core would have a total of 42
assemblies. The core would also have 33 radial blanket assemblies, 42 reflector assemblies and
six control rod assemblies. The radial blanket will have some assemblies replaced with gas
expansion modules which are there to help with power shutdown in the event of coolant loss. (7)
SDriver Fuel 42 Gas Expansion Module 3
Internal Blanket 24 * Shield 48
SControl 6 4 Reflector 42
SUltimate Shutc'own 1 Radial Blanket 33
Figure 3.3 PRISM Fuel Arrangement (8)
The fuel rods would use plutonium recycled from light water reactor (LWR) fuel. The
fuel is designed to have a 4.5 year lifespan with fuel removed and replaced with a burnup of 135
MWd/kg. The blanket assemblies are designed to have a lifespan of 7.5 years and a max burnup
of 55MWd/kg. (6)
The plutonium content of the fuel is very important to the proliferation resistance of the
PRISM plant. In approaching the design of the safeguard system, the plutonium and uranium
content of the fuel was focused upon because the assumption is made that the proliferator would
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be after fission weapons material. The threat of a dirty bomb is not considered to be major when
compared to what a proliferator could do with fuel rods. The fuel from LWRs can be
reprocessed using pyrometalurgical techniques (following the conversion of U0 2) to U metal but
the composition of the reprocessed fuel has not been determined for the PRISM.
Metal fuel has not been thoroughly proven as metal fuel has so far has been used in
prototype reactors such as the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBRII) which is why some of
the measures against proliferation used at EBRII are being considered for the PRISM.
The PRISM is designed to have a thermal efficiency of 38% and have very minimal spent
fuel produced. No depleted uranium would be produced because the PRISM reactor would act
as a burner of the depleted uranium and other transuranic elements produced at other nuclear
power plants. Also, it is believed the fuel source of the PRISM at the moment would be
effectively inexhaustible because the fuel would be provided by reprocessing spent fuel from
LWRs. Table 3.1 shows a comparison of these characteristics with other reactors.
Table 3.1 Reactor Fuel Comparison (10)
Racc r Type Thernai Eficienm Soent fuel i year Deplete ~rariun Naural
(%) o'nes) raiced / yoa uraniurnvear
_(tonns) (tonrnes
P;RSMR 3 45 195
S-W, SM .6 __ -I. ____
3.2.4 Fuel Handling System
The fuel flow of the PRISM plant is show in Figure 3.4. The fuel is handled inside the
reactor module at all times by the in vessel transfer machine (IVTM). A fuel assembly is
transferred to the reactor by means of a portable fuel enclosure which also acts as a transfer
enclosure for spent fuel assemblies. The assembly is placed in the core and after it completes its
4.5 year lifespan, it is removed and placed in a temporary storage position for a year after which
it is take out of the reactor module and taken to the fuel cycle facility. Here the fuel assemblies
are disassembled and reprocessed to make more fuel for the reactor with waste being stored at
the facility.
Figure 3.4 Fuel Flow in the PRISM
The reactor refueling system (RRS) is designed to operate for the entire 60 year lifespan
of the plant with refueling occurring every 18 months and with the process taking up to 22 days.
At this point, the RRS design is only conceptual and the design can change. (7) The RRS is
comprised of the fuel handling system, the transport system and the shipping system. The RRS
is designed to handle the fuel through its entire run in the plant. When refueling occurs, the
reactor is shutdown and the sodium cooled to 480 K.
Figure 3.5 shows the progression of fuel through the reactor module with some
safeguards. A new fuel assembly is taken into the reactor module by way of the transfer cask
which is in the portable fuel enclosure. A fresh fuel pin is lowered into an in-vessel transfer
position and then taken by the in-vessel transfer machine and moved into an empty position in
the core. A spent fuel assembly is moved into an in-vessel storage position. Here the assembly
will stay for a year to reduce the decay heat coming from the assembly. A PRISM reactor can
store up to 22 assemblies at one time in the temporary storage above the reactor core. After
spending a year above the core, the spent fuel assembly is moved to the transfer position by the
IVTM and then it is moved into the transfer cask. This process is similar to the way other
assemblies in the core are handled but the other assemblies do not need to spend a year in
temporary storage above the reactor.
Spent -
Fuel
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Figure 3.5 Fuel Through the Reactor Module with Safeguards
The refueling enclosure would contain the transfer cask and would be moved by the cask
transporter. A driver would then take the cask transporter to the fuel cycle facility which can be
located at the same plant or to the closest one available. As stated before, fuel cycle facilities
would not be located at all PRISM based plants and so the spent fuel assemblies would be
transported from one plant to another with a fuel cycle facility. This would place the fuel
assemblies out of the secure plant location.
3.2.5 Fuel Cycle Facility
The reprocessing of spent fuel from light water reactors (LWR) is the source of fuel for
the new generation of fast liquid metal reactors (LMR). After production of LMRs has
increased, the reprocessing of spent fuel from LMRs would be another source of fresh fuel.
Figure 3.6 shows the flow of spent fuel and fresh fuel to and from LWR, LMR, and spent fuel
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reprocessing facilities (SFRF). The reprocessing of spent fuel depends on its source. LWR
spent fuel is reduced from its oxide form into a metallic form. Afterward, it is put through the
pyroprocess developed by Argonne National Labs (ANL). The reprocessed fuel has three
"streams" coming from it. The first contains the transuranic elements to be burned in the fast
reactors, the second contains the uranium and plutonium used to fuel the PRISM reactor, and the
third has the waste from the process such as fission products. The fuel cycle study indicates that
only 0.1% of the transuranics will go into the waste stream. (8)
Figure 3.6
sh Fuel
Ad For
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LMRs LMRs LMRs
Spent Fuel Flow from LWRs to LMRs (10)
The LWR spent fuel pins and reprocessed in very much the same manner as the LMR
fuel pins save for the reduction to metal. Figure 3.7 shows the process through which spent fuel
pins go through to extract fresh fuel and waste.
R
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Figure 3.7 Fuel Reprocessing (10)
The fuel pins are disassembled in a temporary storage. The fuel pins are removed from
the assemblies and then any assembly material that is not nuclear is disposed of. The pins are
then chopped up so that they can be processed. The chopped pins are placed in an anode basket
and for the pyroprocess, it is expected that the baskets will contain about 10 kg of plutonium.
Figure 3.8 shows the progression of fuel and waste as it goes through the pyroprocess. The
electrorefiner separates the uranium, plutonium and other actinides (TRU) from the spent fuel.
The anode product is then transferred to the cathode processor where the fission products,
typically salts, are removed. The mixture of uranium, plutonium and actinides is then sent off be
processed into new fuel. The uranium/plutonium and TRU metal is melted into new fuel ingots
which are then made into new fuel pins. After being moved to the receiving cell at the fuel cycle
facility, the pins are put together into fuel assemblies and ready to be used in the PRISM reactor.
The waste that is extracted from the process is then stored at the facility. The waste
consists of the steel cladding that encases the fuel and the fission products removed from the fuel
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during processing. Fission products are converted into a ceramic waste for. Both types of
wastes are stored at the facility.
Figure 3.8 Pyroprocessing (11)
4. Diversion Scenarios
In order for a diverter to have the potential for creating a nuclear weapon, they must
successfully obtain a minimum of two fuel assembly from the PRISM plant. Two scenarios have
been developed for the most likely points of diversion of the fuel.
4.1 Dummy Fuel Element
A diverter may develop a dummy fuel element in order to replace a fuel assembly that
they may try to steal. The purpose of the dummy fuel element is to allow for the diversion of a
real fuel assembly to occur without notice. Doing so would require the diverter to have access to
the fuel assemblies and know the different details and features of the assemblies. Also, if the
24
diverter managed to remove a fuel assembly and replace it with a dummy, this could allow the
diverter more time to create a nuclear weapon or sell the fuel to someone who has the technology
to build the weapon without having the IAEA for them.
4.1.1 Creating the Dummy
A diverter must create a fuel element that would have the same mass, radiation levels and
decay power as a normal spent fuel assembly. There are different dummies that a diverter may
to choose to use, such as one assembly that only looks like a real assembly and would appear to
fit into the assembly storage and meets all of the criteria listed above. The dummy could be
made mostly of nuclear waste products, useless transuranics or fission products. It would then
be coated with a uranium and plutonium mix that would allow it to have a similar radiation
signature to a real fuel assembly. The mass, radiation signature, isotopic composition and
possibly heat would be very similar.
4.1.2 Diverting from the Storage Area
The dummy element would replace a real assembly at a point where the diverter may be
able to have access to the fuel assemblies. The points at which this could occur would be the
temporary storage of spent fuel in the reactor building or the transportation of fuel from the
facility.
A dummy element inserted into the fuel cycle at a point where fuel is sitting for up to a
year allows for a few potential advantages. Firstly, the fuel is not moved from its location for up
to a year and the diverter may be one who could gain access to the IVTM and move a fuel pin
out of the storage area. The time given to the fuel for cool down would allow a diverter days or
months to move the fuel assembly out of the facility. The time would also be crucial because it
may allow more time for the diverter to get the fuel out before someone notices the dummy
element is not real. The diverter would then have to move the assembly out of the reactor
building and out of the facility. This can occur through use of a transporter with shielding for the
radiation of the element.
4.1.3 Diverting During Transportation
An alternative and more likely diversion point would have to be a diverter making a
switch after the fuel has been loaded into a transporter and taken from the plant or to the plant.
At some point between the fuel being loaded until is unloaded at a different site, a diverter may
have the transporter stopped and attempt to remove a fuel assembly and then replace it with the
dummy element. The outside diversion means the diverter does not have to go through the
physical barriers such as armed security personnel and walls to get away with the fuel and
therefore diversion is easier from this point.
4.2 Entire Cask Diversion
The diversion scenario which results in the most gain for the diverter is that where an
entire cask loaded with a load of fuel assemblies is stolen. This would allow the diverter to
ensure that enough nuclear material would be obtained for a nuclear weapon (perhaps multiple
ones) and also as before, access to the cask would be much easier if they try to divert the fuel
outside of the facility during transportation. The main disadvantage to this scenario, for the
diverter, is that such a diversion would not go unnoticed for very long so time to sell or build the
weapon would be critical.
The diverter would either try to take control of the transporter and take it to a secured
location or try to replace the transporter cask with another cask that would serve as a sort of
dummy cask. It would then be possible for the diverter to have more time to escape with the fuel
and sell or create the weapon themselves.
5. Safeguard System for the PRISM Plant
5.1 System Description
The PRISM safeguard system has been developed through following the fuel through its
movement in the plant and its transfer to the fuel cycle facility. The components of the system
can serve as either, barriers to the diversion of fuel or serve to detect diversion or attempted
diversion. The system would also have physical barriers such as walls or fences with entry to the
plant at only selected points. Armed security would also be present at the site and would be
provided at the discretion of the host state. Figure 5.1 shows the plant and fuel cycle facility and
the safeguards in place for the fuel. The transportation for fuel to a fuel cycle facility not co-
located with the plant would also have safeguards implemented into it. There are multiple
components for certain points for redundancy.
Figure 5.1 PRISM Safeguards
5.1.1 Plant Safeguards
The entire plant would be monitored by camera and this would be the first defense
against diversion. Refueling occurs every 18 months. The fuel assemblies are taken out by the
IVTM and moved into a storage area on a storage rack as shown in Figure 5.2. There are
radiation detectors in the reactor building to detect if fuel is moved out of the building through
unauthorized exits. These core discharge monitors are mounted on the walls and ceilings of the
building. As the fuel is moved to the storage area, it is loaded onto the rack. The rack would be
on a weight scale. The scale would observe the weight of the fuel at all times during the one
year cool down period. This serves as a way of monitoring the presence of the fuel at all times.
The IVTM's motions are recorded and if the weight of the rack does not match the anticipated
7 Video Monitoring
] Gamma Detector
S Neutron Detector
F Weight Scale
Wi[] Canister Seals
EfL~ Portal Monitor
GPS Tracking
system (Truck and
Bundles)
SIsotope Verification
[ Pin movement
recording
weight given by the IVTM's motions, an alarm would sound. If a pin is moved, the scale would
see this movement immediately and so moving fuel without authorization would not be possible.
Figure 5.2 Storage Rack (5)
The fuel is loaded into a transfer cask to be taken to a fuel cycle facility and at this point,
a spent fuel assembly counter, would verify the radiation signature of the fuel as it is loaded in.
This system can eventually be replaced by Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence which can verify the
isotopic content of the fuel. Before being loaded for transfer, the assemblies would have
radiofrequency identification tags placed on them to allow for easier tracking and verification.
The transfer cask is then loaded onto the cask transporter and taken out of the plant to the fuel
cycle facility. As shown in Figure 5.1, this would occur for all three reactors in each power
block. They would all have the same safeguard components installed in them.
In addition to the physical barriers of the plant and fuel cycle facility, the entry points of
these facilities would have portal monitors installed for both vehicles and personnel. The
personnel monit6rs would have weight scales on them which would monitor any unusual
changes in weight of people who may try to carry shielded nuclear material out of the plant
themselves. The portal monitors detect gamma and neutron radiation coming from nuclear fuel.
If a power outage occurs, the monitors have internal batteries allowing them to operate for
several hours. If that fails, the security personnel can manually inspect the people or vehicles
trying to enter or leave with handheld radiation monitors.
5.1.2 Transportation Safeguards
The most vulnerable aspect of the fuel movement is during transportation. Fuel from
LWRs and fresh fuel from the fuel cycle facility must also be accounted for.
The transport cask and the transporter would be fitted with GPS tracking systems to allow
the security center of the plant to track the position of the fuel. Both the transporter and cask
must be located together. There would be electronic seals on the cask to ensure that the cask is
not opened during its time outside of the plant. If the host state has the infrastructure in place,
satellite monitoring of the transporter could provide visual confirmation of location and activities
of the cask and transporter.
5.1.3 Fuel Cycle Facility Safeguards
The fuel cycle facility would also have portal monitors and weight scales installed at the
entry points. The facility would scan the identification tags place on the fuel and also verify
them using radiation detectors or the nuclear resonance fluorescence machine. The waste storage
of the facility would be monitored by radiation detectors and also have tamper indicating seals
on the waste containers. The entire facility would also be monitored by camera.
5.2 System Component Descriptions
5.2.1 Core Discharge Monitor
A core discharge monitor (CDM) would be installed on near the core in the in-vessel
storage area. Along with the weigh scale, the CDM would monitor the removal of fuel
assemblies from the reactor by the IVTM. It is small enough to be mounted anywhere in the
.storage area and the reactor building. The system insures that unauthorized fuel removal is
recognized immediately.
The CDM verifies the fuel assemblies as they are removed from the core and kept in
storage for one year. The system consists of "fission and ionization chamber, preamplifiers for
the fission chambers and a GRAND electronics package." (9) The system is designed to be
unattended and there are currently 25 systems installed in CANDU reactors. (10) It is one of the
systems that is being taken from the CANDU safeguard systems and being used in the PRISM
safeguard system because of its proven record and satisfaction of the IAEA safeguards.
The CDM would have its readings compared to the recorded movements of the IVTM. If
the CDM measures changes in the intensity of the radiation from the fuel that are not in keeping
with cool down, and the IVTM does not show movement of fuel assemblies.
5.2.2 Spent Fuel Bundle Counter
The Spent Fuel Bundle Counter (SFBC) is taken from the CANDU safeguard system as
well. The SFBC is designed to take in a fuel assembly and use He-3 radiation detectors to verify
the bundles as they are moved from the storage position to the transfer cask in the portable fuel
enclosure. (11) The counter uses tungsten shielding for the He-3 detectors to protect them from
the intense gamma radiation coming from the spent fuel.
The counter's measurements verify that the fuel is present as it goes past the detectors.
This prevents a dummy element from going unnoticed. The SFBC would work in conjunction
with the isotope verification machine located in close proximity.
5.2.3 Special Nuclear Material Portal Monitors and Weight Scales
One of the more common ways to secure nuclear material at a plant is to use monitors
that detect the presence of nuclear material carried by vehicles or people leaving the plant.
Portal monitors have been used at national laboratories that house nuclear materials and have
been very successful at preventing the diversion of nuclear material. (15) These same monitors
can be used at borders of countries and entry points such as ship yards to detect the flow of
nuclear material. The monitors can be gamma or neutron radiation detectors or a combination.
These "monitors collect and analyze radiation data emitted by weapons grade or reactor grade
nuclear material." (9)
Canberra and Los Alamos National Laboratory have developed these monitors with
specific problems in mind. First the monitors must be sensitive enough to detect the special
nuclear material. There should also be as few false alarms as possible to allow operations at a
plant to run smoothly and not unnecessarily detain people and vehicles not carrying any
unauthorized material. The monitors are also designed with tampering prevention features in
mind. There are also other considerations that must be made such as the isotopic content. For
the PRISM, the plutonium is reactor grade while the uranium is natural uranium. The reactor
grade plutonium is harder to detect because of the higher radiation detection limit with these
monitors and the natural low enriched uranium is harder to detect because of its lower gamma
radiation emission when compared to enriched uranium. The PRISM uses metal fuel and this
must be considered when setting the detection limit of the neutron and gamma detectors.
Neutron detectors are considered for use in the portals because high density shielding materials
do not attenuate fission neutrons as much as gamma rays. Background radiation is also a
consideration. Elevation is a strong factor when considering the detection limit and so again
combination neutron/gamma detector portals can be used to prevent false alarms.
The vehicle and personnel portal monitors are very similar but their configurations vary.
Figure 5.3 shows a vehicle portal monitor. The monitors work by comparing the measurements
taken when a vehicle or person is in the monitor to a threshold measurement set when the
monitors are empty. The Sequential Probability Test Ratio is used for the monitors. The portal
controller examines small count intervals and these intervals are compared to two thresholds:
background and background plus that of a transient. There is a variance analyzer in the monitor
which will sound an alarm if changes in the background are larger than expected. The alarm of
the monitor will sound when the background passes a set upper or lower limit threshold and if
the difference between background and the intervals exceeds are set threshold.
Figure 5.3 Vehicle Portal Monitor (15)
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The monitors have low noise electronics that also prevent false alarms. There is also
battery backup in the monitors that allow for them to operate continually for several hours in the
case of a blackout. The monitors themselves are encased in a weather-tight low Z material to
prevent neutron and gamma ray attenuation. There are doors that allow access to the detectors
but are secured with key locks and tamper indicating devices (TID) which show any attempt to
tamper with the electronics inside. There is also a "secured communication port (which allows)
authorized personnel to set and change the threshold values". (9) The monitors are also designed
to have easily replaceable mechanical and electronic parts.
The two detectors used in these portal monitors are gamma and neutron detectors. The
detectors used depend on the nuclear material that is to be monitored for and what kind of
monitor one will be using: either a personnel or vehicle monitor.
Gamma ray detectors are used in the portals to detect gamma rays from enriched uranium
or plutonium. Background is reduced by having the scintillators shielded with lead on three
sides. The scintillation detectors are made of plastic because their ability to capture much of the
gamma radiation from plutonium and they also cost less than equally effective sodium based
scintillators.
Neutron detectors in the monitors are made of "He-3 proportional counters inside a
hollow, high density polyethylene enclosure" to detect thermal neutrons from plutonium. The
neutron detectors would be instead of gamma detectors because gamma ray backgrounds can
fluctuate greatly and neutrons are much harder to shield for.
For the PRISM facility, one would be concerned with guarding spent fuel and fresh fuel
pins which would contain depleted uranium and plutonium. The best choice of monitor would
be a combination monitor which uses both neutron and gamma ray detectors. These monitors
will however be less efficient because two detectors means more detection limits and this opens
up a great possibility of false alarms.
In addition to these detectors, another suggestion in this thesis that the monitors be
combined with metal detectors and weight scales. The metal detectors in personnel monitors
would be able to not only detect weapons such as knives or guns going in and out of the PRISM
plant, but also detect metals being used to shield plutonium. High Z metal would be used to
shield gamma rays but if the metal is not thick enough, the gamma rays would be detected.
However, the metal detectors would prevent this from being a problem.
The weigh scales would serve the purpose of monitoring the weight of people entering
and leaving the PRISM plant. A worker would register a weight with the plant database from
which they could not deviate from by more than a set limit. A limit of about 5 kilograms would
be reasonable because the weight of the nuclear material containing enough plutonium (8 kg) to
produce a weapon would be about 20 kilograms. If a person does go over the limit, they must be
inspected with hand monitors and their new weight registered. The weight of the person entering
the plant would be registered for the day and the weight when they exit may not have a
difference of maybe a few kilograms. These procedures ensure the person is not entering or
leaving with unauthorized materials. Their personal belongings would be inspected separately
from them. This weight monitoring would necessitate a database of all personnel to be used.
The database of weights can be tied into the entry system that the facility chooses to use. Card
scanners are frequently used at many facilities. When a worker scans their personnel card to
enter the facility as an authorized worker, the weight of the person entering can be brought up as
they are about to step into the weigh station which would be under the portal monitor. So an
alarm would sound if the weight of the person is not matching the found in the database, metal is
detected or nuclear material is present.
5.2.4 Geosynchronous Positioning System
As indicated in figure 5.1, there are several safeguards used to monitor the movement of
fuel within the cask transporter. The cask transporter moves the fuel between the reactor
building and the fuel cycle facility. The fuel cycle facility, however, is optional for the PRISM
plant and this means that transportation of spent fuel from the reactor and fresh fuel from the fuel
cycle facility. This allows for diversion to occur outside of the plant and fuel cycle facility
which is one of the more likely points of diversion because of the perceived lack of monitoring.
The cask transporter and cask would both be fitted with Geosynchronous Positioning
Systems (GPS). This safeguard is a component that has not been proposed or used elsewhere
and is being made part of the design for the PRISM plant. The cask would have the GPS on the
outside of it to prevent radiation from the fuel from damaging it and to allow the signal to be
transmitted. The cask transporter would have its GPS in a location to be determined. It would
be in a place accessible for repair or replacement and not dependent on the vehicle. The GPS
would transmit the position of the cask and the cask transporter at all times to the plant control
center as well as the agency tasked with monitoring nuclear fuel movement in the country (ie.
The NRC in the United States).
The prevention of the cask being transferred onto another vehicle is very important and
one of the diversion scenarios that results in the most gain for the diverter. Tracking the position
of the cask and cask transporter independently will allow the agency and plant security center to
verify that the cask has not been loaded onto another vehicle. Both positions shown the GPS
cannot deviate more than a specified amount (to be decided by the security center and nuclear
regulating agency) otherwise, the system will indicate the fuel may be in the process of being
diverted.
The GPS system must be able to transmit its signal so it will not be housed in thick metal
to prevent tampering. Instead, the GPS system would be locked in a tamper indicating sealed
box. An electronic seal would be similar to what is used for the sealing of the transfer cask and
the waste casks at the fuel cycle facility. The electronic seal will show tampering with the box
and if the seal is broken, a signal will be sent to the security center and the country's nuclear
agency alerting them of the tampering which can indicate possible diversion. Sealing technology
to be used is described in the next section.
5.2.5 Sealing Systems
Another non-proliferation measure being taken from the CANDU safeguard system is the
technology used to seal containers with nuclear material. It is important to securely seal the
storage containers of nuclear fuel. Spent fuel assemblies may be transported great distances
from the PRISM plant to the fuel cycle facility and diversion must be detected during this part of
the fuel cycle as well as accounting for the waste. There are several sealing systems used and
their use depends on where the nuclear material is stored. The current sealing system used at
CANDU reactors to store spent fuel is the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Random Coil
(ARC). The seal is tamper-indicating. A new technology (ultrasonic sealing) has also been
developed by the Seals and Identification Laboratory (SILab) which are designed to replace the
ARC seal and still meet IAEA non-proliferation standards.
The CANDU reactors currently store spent fuel on-site and use ARC seals to close the
storage casks. The seals are tamper indicating seals which work by having leaving a physical
mark on the seal if someone tries to gain unauthorized access. (12) The seals are IAEA approved
and inspected regularly while the spent fuel is stored and this insures the spent fuel bundles have
not been diverted.
The new technology designed to replace the ARC seals is ultrasonic sealing and this
technology can be implemented into the PRISM safeguard system. SILab develops technologies
used for sealing and indentifying nuclear materials and they have developed ultrasonic sealing to
replace the current ARC seals because of the advantages the new technology holds over what is
currently being used.
The ultrasonic seal is used like any other seal when it is used to close a container such as
a storage or transport cask. "The internal structure comprises a random identity and a frangible
element ... which breaks when an attempt is made to remove the seals." (13) The system uses a
reading device, made of a transducer, which generates an ultrasonic signal and then reads the
reflected signal. The reader rotates above the seal and records the signal from the seal over a
complete rotation. The core of the seal is a cylinder which contains the "unique identity" of the
seal and the frangible feature which breaks if opened. Figure 5.4 shows the core of the seal and
the indentifying feature. The thin metal rod (shown in the third picture) breaks if a force is
applied to the seal.
Figure 5.4 Seal Core and Tamper Indicating Feature (16)
The reading device and interpreted signal is shown in Figure 5.5. The sound is given off
by the transducer and reflected back when there is a discontinuity in the material. The wave
signal is turned into an electronic signal and analyzed. The intensity of the signal is recorded as
the reader rotates around the seal. The signal of the seal of when it is initially welded in is
compared to the signal during inspection. Discrepancies in intensity will show if a seal is broken
or not as shown in Figure 5.6. The highlighted area shows a change in the signal but the
variation would have to be analyzed to determine if the seal is broken.
Figure 5.5 Reading Device (16)
The ultrasonic sealing system also has a few advantages over the current ARC sealing
system. The ultrasonic seals are resistant to radiation damage and can last decades. Another
advantage is the authenticity and status of the seal is immediately available to an inspector.
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Figure 5.6 Broken Seal Signal Comparison
The PRISM plant would benefit from using these seals because of their ease of use.
Waste stored at the fuel cycle facility can be monitored by camera, radiation detectors and also
be sealed using the ultrasonic seals. In addition to the ultrasonic sealing of storage containers,
electronic seals can be used as an alternative. Figure 5.7 shows a simple electronic seal. The
IAEA has been pushing the development of new sealing technologies for the past six years. (15)
The electronic seal works by having a sealing wire through the seal of a container or cask. If the
wire will break the circuit if the container is opened and this is shown on the seal reader. An
antenna can also be part of the system so that a signal can be sent immediately to the appropriate
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personnel at the security center of the PRISM plant and the IAEA. This sealing system can be
used in order to seal more short term enclosures such as the transfer cask that carries spent fuel
and fresh fuel, to and from the fuel cycle facility.
Sal Reader
Figure 5.7 Electronic Seal (17)
5.2.6 Radio Frequency Identification Tags
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags have been used in a variety of applications to
keep track of different items. Their most common and familiar use is in supermarkets and
department stores for the tracking of inventory. The tracking and verification of fuel in the
PRISM plant and outside of it can be done using the RFID tags in a very similar manner.
The RFID tags consist of two parts. The first is the integrated circuit which contains all
the information concerning the object that is tagged. The second is an antenna that is used to
transmit information from the circuit to the reader using radio waves. There are passive and
active RFID tags. The passive tags do not contain a power supply and instead are powered up
and transmit a signal when a reader is close by and the radio waves of the reader induce a current
in the circuit. The tag can then transmit a signal to the reader. Active tags are those which have
a power supply, such as a battery, on board and can transmit a signal continuously to the reader.
The tags some limitations which must be addressed such as lack of resistance to radiation and
battery life under normal use. However, the research done by the IAEA is seeking to remedy or
reduce the impact of these drawbacks.
The RFID tags would be used to track fuel assemblies throughout their entire movement
in the PRISM plant and the Fuel Cycle Facility. The fuel is put into temporary storage for one
year and after this time, the assemblies would be tagged with and RFID tag, which would contain
necessary information to verify the fuel. The tagging would occur right before the fuel is loaded
into a transfer cask. Information such as date of loading into the cask, the date it was discharged,
and an identification mark such as a serial number would all be in the tag. The tags would help
with quick identification and verification when the fuel is unloaded. This prevents dummy fuel
assemblies from entering the fuel cycle and going unnoticed. The tags themselves will have their
own tamper indicating sealing system designed specifically for the RFID tags. Figure 5.8 shows
an example of a RFID tag which would be attached to a cask or fuel assembly while Figure 5.9
shows an example of a seal used to prevent tampering. The seal would be similar to that of an
electronic seal.
Figure 5.8 RFID Tag (18)
Figure 5.9 RFID Seal (18)
There is current testing being done on the use of RFID tags on containment drums which
are used to transport fissile and radioactive materials. (16) The seals can be large or small and
passive or active. Passive seals can be used for fuel assemblies so that the attached seal can be
small and quickly applied. The larger, active seals would be used for the tracking of more
permanent enclosures such as waste casks and would have battery packs that would allow for
longer distance monitoring by an IAEA inspector.
5.2.7 Closed Circuit Television System
A standard feature of any safeguard system is video monitoring. The CANDU reactors
use Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to monitor all areas of the facility. Each PRISM plant
would have to be surveyed to determine the appropriate locations of cameras around the facility.
The video feed must be able to see every part of the facility and track the movement of all
nuclear materials. Any part of the facility where seals and radiation monitors can be used would
not require a camera. The CCTV system monitors any unauthorized movement of fuel
throughout the plant. This is especially important for monitoring the storage of fuel in the
reactor building and insuring that unauthorized personnel do not attempt to move fuel.
The cameras would be linked to the security center where personnel would monitor them
at all times. Most CCTV systems at nuclear facilities still use tape and film but new digital
systems are starting to replace the aging systems. Cameras such as the Digital Single Camera
Optical Surveillance System (DSOS) are being installed at plants like CANDU and are IAEA
approved. (10) The video would be stored on hard drives located at the PRISM plant and would
last longer and be more secure than traditional tape and film.
5.2.8 Weight Scales
A new feature being added to the PRISM safeguard system is the use of weight scales for
monitoring the presence of fuel and the verification of personnel entering the PRISM plant. The
scale would be used at any point in the fuel's movement where the fuel becomes stationary and
stored for an extended period of time, specifically the storage area in the reactor building and the
fresh fuel storage. The weight of the entire load would be monitored by the security center. If a
change is detected, it would have to be verified by the security personnel and if it is not, an alarm
would sound. With the assemblies packed together, it prevents a diverter from removing a fuel
assembly or pin without notice. They would also not be able to replace the fuel with a dummy
element because if the weight of the entire load changes, either by increasing or decreasing a
certain unauthorized amount, the alarm would sound.
The weight of personnel would also be monitored as they enter and exit the facility as
described in Section 5.2.3. In much the same way, the person entering would have their weight
monitored to insure no nuclear material is carried by the person.
5.2.9 Isotope Verification: Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence
Another new component to the safeguard system is a new technology that can identify
isotopes present in a large enclosure such as a shipping container or for the purposes or the
PRISM plant, a transport cask. It may eventually be used to replace the Spent Fuel Bundle
Counter. The Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) process is shown in Figure 5.10. The first
step is the production of high energy electrons (8 MeV) which are scattered to produce
Bremstrahlung radiation. The Bremstrahlung photons are then collimated and directed toward
the container. The photons will excite the nucleus of the atoms in the container. When the
nucleus comes down to a lower excited state or the ground state, it releases a photon with an
energy specific to the nucleus. Detectors are set up directly in front of the container and to
angles to cover backscattering. (17)
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Figure 5.10 NRF Process
An example of the detected photons from the excited nuclei is given in Figure 5.11. Each
nucleus has it own excitation energy which allows one to identify the specific isotope found in
the scanned container. This NRF scanning would be implemented in a permanent location such
as the storage area in the reactor building. This would verify the fuel assemblies and their
contents. This would make identifying U-235, U-238 and Pu-239 in the assemblies possible and
verify that what is being loaded into the transfer cask from the storage area is the fuel. If a
dummy assembly or fuel pin is present, then the material used to make the dummy element
would show up on the spectrum. This would be because the diverter would not use the same
technology to make the dummy pin or the dummy element would only have the same weight and
look of a pin and would not contain Plutonium or Uranium.
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Figure 5.11 NRF Spectra (19)
5.2.10 Satellite Surveillance
This component would depend on the infrastructure of the host state and if it is willing to
use it for the purpose of monitoring fuel during its transportation. Currently, the European Space
Agency is the only known entity making an effort to use satellites to monitor nuclear material
movement. They are doing this in cooperation with the IAEA. (19)
0I
5.3 Addressing Diversion Scenarios
The dummy element diversion scenario is addressed through the verification of the fuel
using the CANDU's SFBC or the NRF technology. The fuel has to be verified before it leaves
the facility and after it enters it. RFID tags also allow for verification of all fuel assemblies.
However, the removal of a pin from the storage rack would be detected by the weight scale and
so a dummy element would do the diverter no good if they cannot get an assembly out in the first
place. The portal monitors would also prevent the diverter from leaving with the pin or entering
with the dummy element if the safeguards in the reactor building fail.
6. Conclusion
6.1 System Application
The safeguard system for the PRISM power plant is based on a constantly changing
design. But this proves to be an advantage for the SFR project as this safeguard system could
easily be modified to be used if a different reactor is used.
The CANDU safeguard system proved to be a good base for the development of the
PRISM system. The components were not only taken from the CANDU system, but alternatives
to some components, such as the NRF identification, were included if possible.
Diversion scenarios were developed in order to help with the thought process of
developing the safeguard system. The scenarios provided insight into what the diverter would
hope to achieve and what the most likely way to achieve this end would be. The addition of GPS
tracking and weight scales is due to addressing the diversion scenarios with a simple yet
effective technology.
6.2 Work to be Done
Work to be done includes doing cost analysis and verifying that technology not used for
safeguards is approved by the IAEA. The purpose of the SFR project is to create a power plant
system that is cost effective. The safeguard system must not raise the cost of the plant.
However, an analysis of the cost versus the advantage of having more safeguards in place to
mitigate negative feelings against nuclear power must be done.
New technology such as the NRF identification must also be tested for use in a power
plant environment and to insure that the IAEA approves this component. IAEA approval is
important, especially for a host state which has not yet started a nuclear power program and
would need international help and approval to do so.
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